Russian Democracy Ends on the Borders of Ukraine

Viktor Yushchenko and the millions of Ukrainians who are standing on freezing streets demonstrating throughout Ukraine have something to be thankful for to the Czech Republic.

It was in the Czech Republic where Mykola Melnychenko, the man who secretly recorded Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma plotting illegal activities with his subordinates, hid when the Ukrainian secret police were looking for him in 2001 and began telling the world what he knew.

Had there been no Melnychenko, there would most likely never have been an orange revolution of such magnitude in Ukraine.

In November 2004 Ukrainians voted massively against corruption in government and criminality. And while most people knew that their leaders were corrupt - Melnychenko provided the conclusive proof that their fears were genuine.

The pro- Yushchenko voters were convinced that their candidate had won the second round of the elections - two major exit polls showed that he was victorious. But then the Central Electoral Commission unofficially announced that the prime minister, Viktor Yanukovych was the winner. Yushchenko immediately claimed that the count was falsified.

Responding to the news, Russian president Vladimir Putin, prematurely charged through an open door to congratulate Yanukovych, not once but twice, before his victory was officially announced - and never will be it seems.

Everything pointed to the fact that comrade Stalin had been right when he stated that it was not important how people voted, it was important who counted the votes.

On December 1st, Kuchma announced that the vote had not been falsified.

This was disproved the very next day when a member of the Central Electoral Commission testified before the Supreme Court and told the judges how 1 million votes were falsified by the vote counters.

That evening 500,000 people gathered on Independence Square in Kyiv to show Putin and Kuchma how they felt.

The popular outrage to the falsification of the second round of voting by the Kuchma government created a crisis in the country with strong repercussions around the world.

Prior to the elections it was clear that Vladimir Putin was supporting Viktor Yanukovych, the man in whose favor the votes were manipulated. This in turn woke up much of Europe to the realities of the former Soviet Union and showed that there was a „Putin Doctrine“, not unlike the earlier „Brezhnev Doctrine,“ and that it was meant to limit national independence in the nations of the former USSR.

The reasons why Moscow considers it normal to interfere in Ukrainian elections is because Ukrainian quasi-independence is seen to be in its vital national interests. The motives for this are:

1. Security and control over the pipeline system which transits through Ukraine and supplies Central and Western Europe with Russian gas. This gas can be used as a tool for blackmailing Europe into obeying Russian wishes. Sales of this gas also provide the money needed for the Russian budget.

2. Gradually tying Ukraine closer to the Russian economy through the so-called Common Economic Zone agreement, the ultimate goal of which is to allow Russia to determine Ukraine's markets, make it totally dependent on Russian energy supplies and suborn the Ukrainian economic infrastructure to its needs.

Putin, it should be kept in mind, does not intend to make the same mistake made by Lenin and Stalin of making Ukraine into a colony of Russia and absorb it into the Russian Federation, he prefers to make it into a willing and obedient junior partner. All Putin wants is to control 50 percent plus one share of Ukraine.

3. Prevent Ukrainian integration into NATO and the European Union and keep it as a pro-Russian buffer zone between Russia and the new members of NATO and the EU.

On December 2, Leonid Kuchma and Vladimir Putin met in Moscow to plot their next move. They insisted that new elections be held and were adamant that the second round of voting, the falsified round, not be repeated. The reason for this being that Yanukovych stood little chance of being elected in a fair re-run of the second round.

Yanukovych's support for calls for autonomy in Eastern Ukraine after pro-Yushchenko demonstrations began in Kyiv, elicited a very strong negative reaction from business and political leaders, as well as among public opinion in all regions of Ukraine and insured his defeat in a re-run.

Both Kuchma and Putin knew that if Yanukovych lost, their plans would collapse, and the Russian money invested into Yanukovych's campaign would be wasted, so it was best to call for new elections.

What else the two leaders decided was not made public. Some commentators have not ruled out the possibility that Kuchma asked Putin to provide him with sanctuary in case he had to flee Ukraine.

Earlier that same day, the European parliament issued a statement rejecting new elections and called for the second round to be repeated, thus placing it diametrically opposed to Putin and Kuchma and on the side of Yushchenko.

As these events were unfurling, hundreds of thousands of people on the streets of Kyiv were supporting Yushchenko's ultimatum that he would only agree to a re-run of the second vote.

Adding to the discomfort of the Kuchma/Putin team was the lack of a suitable candidate to replace Yanukovych with in case another election was held. The only candidate who appeared on the horizon was Serhiy Tyhipko, Yanukovych's former campaign manager, who simultaneously held the position of head of the Central Bank. Tyhipko left Yanukovych's campaign on 30 November and told the press that if new elections were to be held, he would run for president.

Tyhipko's weakness was his close identification with Yanukovych and with the emerging crisis in the Ukrainian banking industry. This crisis was linked to the economic consequences of Yanukovych's decision as prime minister to double pensions on the eve of the elections. The opposition called the rise in pensions, pre-election bribes which would fuel inflation.

A dangerous by-product of the failed elections in Ukraine were the unexpected threats by the leadership of two regions in Eastern Ukraine, Donetsk and Luhansk, to declare autonomy within Ukraine.

The reason for this rebellion in the eastern part of the country was due to the pre-election tactics of the Yanukovych campaign. Both Donetsk and Luhansk are highly dependent upon the coal industry for their existence and political power. However, given the unprofitability of the coal industry, they rely to a large degree on subsidies from Kyiv.

As in most other countries with coal industries, the local coal mine supports the town or city in which it is located. If the mine were to close or lose its subsidies, the town would be ruined, schools and hospitals closed and thousands of people would be out of work. The Yanukovych campaign falsely claimed that Yushchenko wanted to close the mines and end subsidies. This generated fear which was then used by the local leadership as a means to try and blackmail the country into accepting the falsified results. Needless to say, most of the falsifications took place in these two regions. It was also not coincidental that prior to becoming prime minister, Yanukovych had been governor of Donetsk region.

As calls for autonomy mounted in the East, Russian politicians flocked to the region urging the local leadership to rebel against Kyiv, hinting that support from Russia would be forthcoming. The Mayor of Moscow, Yuriy Luzhkov, recently discredited for his interference in the elections in Abkhazia, appeared at a meeting of local councils in the city of Severodonetsk and lent his voice to their demands.

In all probability Ukraine will not split into East and West nor will the Eastern regions join Russia. The tactic of using separatism as political blackmail does not have any major support and the idea of isolated mini-regions run by disreputable clans is not an appealing choice. But it is also undeniable that local self-government will need to be strengthened throughout the country to reflect regional economic differences.

As the crisis goes into a critical stage, it is almost impossible to predict with any measure of accuracy its outcome. Despite the wishes of Putin, Kuchma, the European Union or the United States, the real decision making today is on the streets of Ukraine. If the demonstrators believe they are being cheated or deceived they will defend their decision to oust what they considered to be bad government and replace it with their choice.

Whatever the outcome may be, it is undeniable that Ukrainian society has undergone a tremendous change in the past two weeks. The 10 year's of Kuchma's rule was a lesson that once criminality becomes an integrated function of the state it will do everything possible to remain in power.

As Putin watches these events in the Kremlin, there can be not doubt that somewhere in the back of his mind he fears a repeat of the Ukrainian scenario in Russia. It is a lesson in democracy which he will never forget.

It is altogether not a coincidence that the other leaders who sent Yanukovych congratulations on his non-election were China, Belarus, Transdnister along with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. All these members of a rapidly dwindling club of oppressive regimes fervently want Ukraine to remain in their club.